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Changes in the use of land in the United States produce significant economic and environmental
effects with important implications for a wide variety of policy issues, including protection of
wildlife habitat, management of urban growth, and mitigation of global climate change.  In contrast
to previous descriptive and qualitative analyses of the trends in national land use, this paper uses an
econometric approach to isolate the importance of historical changes in land-use profits and key
government policies in determining national land-use changes from 1982 to 1997.  The policies we
examine are the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and total government payments to crop
producers.  We estimate a national-level discrete choice model of changes among the major land-use
categories (crops, pasture, forest, urban, range, and CRP)  with parcel-level observations of land use
and land quality from the U.S.D.A. National Resources Inventory (NRI) and measures of county-
level land-use net returns from a variety of sources.  We then use fitted values from the econometric
model to simulate land-use change from 1982 to 1997 under a series of factual and counterfactual
scenarios that isolate the effects of different economic and policy factors.   The simulations suggest
how changes in economic returns and government policies have driven land-use changes in the past
and will continue to affect nationwide land-use changes in the future.  For example, we find that the
introduction of the CRP and the decline in crop profits were the most significant explanatory factors
driving the decline in cropland. Our results highlight some “unintended consequences” of
government policies and the importance of net returns to a range of alternative land uses as
determinants of land area change for each particular use.3
Determinants of Land-Use Change in the United States, 1982-1997:
Results from a National-Level Econometric and Simulation Analysis
Ruben N. Lubowski, Andrew J. Plantinga, and Robert N. Stavins
1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, the United States has experienced historically large shifts in land
use and land-use trends.  From 1982 to 1997 in the contiguous 48 states, cropland decreased about
10%, urban areas increased by almost half, and forested land area began to rise after having declined
since the early 1960s.
1  Such broad changes in land allocation and land-use trends produce significant
economic and environmental effects with implications for a wide variety of policy issues, including
maintenance of water quality, preservation of open space, and mitigation of global climate change.
Economists have documented these nationwide land-use trends and identified different
determinants of land-use change.   However, there has been little effort to assess and compare the
importance of the different economic and policy factors that are believed to affect land use in the
U.S.  Understanding the relative influence of these different factors is important to predict future
trends and to design potential public policies aimed at land use.
In order to expand our understanding of the determinants of national-level land-use
dynamics, this paper identifies the relative impact of the different factors driving changes among the
major land-use categories over recent history in the 48 contiguous United States.   We focus on the
period from 1982 to 1997 and evaluate the effects of changes in the profitability of different land-
use alternatives and the effects of two key national policies directed at land use.  In particular, we
examine the land-use impacts of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest U.S. federal
program targeting land use, which paid landowners to voluntarily retire about 32.6 million acres of
cropland from 1985 to 1997.   We also analyze the land-use impacts of total government payments
to farmers, which contributed significantly to the profitability of crop production during most of our
period of our analysis.
Assuming profit-maximizing landowners, the classic theory dating to the nineteenth century
explains land-use patterns in terms of the relative rents to the alternative uses.  These rents will vary
with land characteristics, particularly soil fertility and location as first emphasized by David Ricardo
and Johann von Thunen, respectively.  A number of studies over the past two decades have
                                                
1 The Appendix discusses the definitions of the different land-use categories used in this paper.4
empirically examined the determinants of private land-use decisions.  These studies statistically
estimate the relationship between observed land-use patterns (or land-use changes) and explicit or
proxy measures for land rents.  This literature supports the theoretical predictions that land rents are
the principal determinants of land-use patterns.  In addition, because data on actual land rents are
typically available only for a county or other aggregate level, studies demonstrate the importance of
accounting for the heterogeneity of factors, particularly land quality, that affect land-use profits for
the individual landowner (e.g. Lichtenberg 1986; Stavins and Jaffe 1990; Plantinga 1996).   Studies
examining urban development also show the importance of location, chiefly distance from cities, as
a proxy for the rents to urban development (e.g. Mauldin, Plantinga and Alig 1999a, 1999b).
2
While these studies identify important determinants of land-use change, there has been little
analysis of the relative importance of different factors in driving historical land-use changes.   A
notable exception is the study by Stavins and Jaffe (1990).  They use an econometric model to
simulate land-use change in the Mississippi delta under a series of counterfactual scenarios that
isolate the relative importance of flood control projects and other factors in driving the depletion of
forested wetlands from 1935 to 1984.
3   At the national level, a series of USDA reports describe
major nationwide land-use trends and provide some qualitative discussion of the principal land-use
drivers.  These include studies from the Economic Research Service (Daugherty 1991, 1995;
Anderson and Magleby 1997; Krupa and Vesterby 2001; Heimlich and Anderson 2001) and the U.S.
Forest Service (Alig and Wear 1992; Alig, Dicks, and Moulton 1998; Flather, Brady and Knowles
1999).
In contrast to these descriptive and qualitative analyses of the trends in national land use, the
current paper uses an econometric approach to quantify the relative impact of different land-use
drivers at the national level.  The basis for our analysis is an econometric model of national land-use
change among the six major land-use categories (crops, forest, pasture, urban, range, and CRP).
Previous econometric-based analyses of private land-use choices have focused on relatively small
geographic areas such as regions or single states.  The few previous studies with national-level data
have examined changes in a single land-use category without modeling the full range of land-use
alternatives that simultaneously influence land-use changes at the national scale. These studies
                                                
2 In theory, a landowner’s individual characteristics, including age, skill, income, and risk preferences, might also affect
the choice of alternative land uses.   Although authors have argued that these factors should be included in empirical
land-use models (Alig, Dicks, and Moulton 1998), few studies include these factors due to lack of data.
3 Ahn et al. (2002) also use a similar approach to examine the relative importance of different factors in determining
historical changes in forest area in the South Central U.S. from 1964 to 1997.5
examine urban areas (Alig and Healy 1987), government conservation programs (Parks and Kramer
1987; Poe 1998; Plantinga et al. 2001), and timberland (Plantinga and Buongiorno 1990).  Our
broader geographical scope requires consideration of a comprehensive menu of land-use
alternatives.  We consider a greater number of land-use alternatives than previous authors with the
exception of work that distinguishes among different forest ownerships in the U.S. South (Alig 1985,
1986; Alig, Dicks, and Moulton 1988) and five different urban uses in the San Francisco Bay area
(Landis and Zhang 1998a, 1998b).
Due to the scarcity and cost of obtaining data on individual land-use decisions, land-use
studies generally use aggregate data for a county or other geographic region.  One disadvantage of
these studies using aggregate data is that they examine factors affecting land disposition (e.g. levels in
base area shares allocated to each land use) as opposed to changes in land use in terms of transitions
among particular land-use categories.  As a result, these analyses provide only indirect information
on individuals’ choices regarding particular land-use changes, which might be of interest.
4   The
series of studies of land-use change that do use parcel-level data generally focus on urban use and
examine the determinants of conversion from a generic non-urban (undeveloped) use to a single
urban (developed) state.
5  For example, a series of studies with spatially-explicit data examine
conversion from undeveloped to residential uses in Central Maryland using parcel data from county
tax assessment offices (Bockstael 1996; Bockstael and Bell 1997; Irwin and Bockstael 2002).
We estimate a discrete choice model of land-use transitions among with parcel-level
observations of land use and land quality from the USDA National Resources Inventory (NRI) and
measures of county-level land-use net returns from a variety of sources.  Our focus on land-use
change among a variety of categories raises a number of empirical challenges, including the need to
take into consideration the possibility of different substitution patterns among the land-use
alternatives.  To address this issue, we use a nested logit specification for the probability of change
from one land-use category to another.
To evaluate the relative importance of the different economic and policy factors on land-use
change, we conduct a version of the analytical experiment in Stavins and Jaffe (1990).  Specifically,
                                                
4 Notable exceptions are a few studies that either examine one-way land transitions, such as transitions from agricultural
to urban uses (Hsieh, Irwin and Forster 2001; Irwin, Hsieh, and Libby 2002), or explicitly use econometric methods to
recover the unobserved land-use transitions (Plantinga and Ahn 2002).
5 A few authors have used parcel-level data to study transitions among non-urban uses.   Using parcel-level data from the
NRI, Claassen (1993) also examines land-use changes between crops and pasture and crops and forests in South
Carolina while Claassen and Tegene (1999) model changes between crops and pasture in the Corn Belt region.  Schatzki
(2003) uses NRI parcel-level data to study the effects of uncertainty on transitions between crops and forests in Georgia.6
we use fitted values from the econometric model to simulate land-use change from 1982 to 1997
under a series of different scenarios.  A simulation with the historically observed values of all
variables (the “factual” simulation) provides a basis for comparison with a series of counter-factual
scenarios.  In these counter-factuals, one or more of the explanatory variables is set at a hypothetical
value and all the other variables are kept at their historically observed values.  The difference in the
simulated land-use changes between the counterfactual and factual simulations provides an estimate
of the land-use impact of the historical realizations of the economic or policy variable(s) of interest,
relative to the hypothetical scenario.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections.  The next section reviews our
econometric model, data, and estimation results.  Section 3 describes our factual and counter-factual
simulations and presents our simulation results on the relative importance of the different land-use
determinants. Section 4 discusses these results and provides concluding comments.
2. National-Level Econometric Model of Land Use
Our econometric modeling approach follows the land-use literature in identifying profits per
acre and land quality measures as the driving factors of landowner decisions and in using a random
utility specification for landowner returns.  We use this framework to specify an econometric model
representing land-use change as a first-order Markov process.  Markov transition probabilities are
specified as functions of county-level land-use returns, plot-specific land quality measures, and
parameters to be estimated.  Modeling transitions among a broad set of land-use options introduces
the econometric challenge of accounting for potentially different substitution patterns among the
various choices.  We estimate the parameters of the transition probabilities using a nested logit that
allows for variation in substitutability among different subgroups of the land-use choices.  In this
section, we first present our econometric model and then review selected estimation results.
2.1 Nested Logit Model
To motivate our econometric model, we begin with the optimization problem for an
individual risk-neutral landowner faced with the choice of allocating a parcel of land of uniform quality
among a set of alternative uses.  Under simplifying assumptions
6, given a parcel of land i in use  k  at
                                                
6 Simplifying assumptions include constant returns to scale in land and perfect land and credit markets.  We also assume
that landowners do not account for future conversion possibilities when evaluating alternative land-use options.  A more
detailed discussion of the landowner's optimization problem is provided by Lubowski (2002).7
time t, a profit-maximizing landowner will choose the land use j at time t+1 that yields the highest
expected present discounted value of an infinite stream of net returns minus conversion costs.  To
produce an econometrically tractable model, we assume landowners have static expectations over
future net returns.  It seems reasonable that landowners base at least part of their expectations of
future net returns on current or historic levels of returns.
7   The landowner’s decision rule is then to
choose the use with the highest current one-period return minus the current one-period opportunity
cost of undertaking conversion.  The landowner chooses use k at time t if:
() kt jkt jkt jt Rr Ca R ′ −> (1)
for all alternatives j where Rjt is the instantaneous net benefits from an acre of land in use j at time t,
Cjkt(a)  are the total costs of converting a acres of land from use j to use k at time t; and r is the
discount rate (r>0).
Given that we do not have reliable data on all variables that might affect the landowner’s
returns to the different uses, we write the landowner’s profit function to include both observed and
unobserved components.  Imposing different structures on the unobserved components produces
different classes of probabilistic models in which the probabilities will always lie in the unit interval
and sum to one.  We develop a two-level nested logit specification as it is the most tractable model
for problems with multiple choices that still permits for differences in the substitutability among
alternatives.
8  The nested logit imposes requires “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA)
within but not across particular subgroups of alternatives.
 9
We assume that the choice set can be partitioned into S mutually-exclusive subgroups which
share certain unobserved components, thus introducing covariance among the utilities of choices
within a particular nest.  A two-level nested logit model decomposes of the choice probability into
two components: the marginal probability  ijst P  of choosing a particular subgroup or “nest” s
                                                
7 In an analysis of models of farmland price changes, Just and Miranowski (1993) report that an expectations model
based on lagged values performs better than models based on forward looking price expectations.
8 Multinomial probit models allow an unrestricted covariance matrix for the errors, but large models still face
computational limits (Greene 2001). The most general model for relaxing the IIA property is the random parameters
(also called “mixed” or “kernel”) logit which has recently received increasing attention and application (see Train 2003
for a review).  While this model is theoretically appealing, estimation requires simulation methods that are
computationally very intensive.  Simulation bias is also a potential problem that will be exacerbated in the case of
relatively small probabilities and large numbers of observations.
9 The assumption of independent disturbances in the logit model implies that the ratio of the probabilities of any two
choices must be independent of the other alternatives.   This IIA property is a well-known limitation of logit models as it
imposes potentially important restrictions on the admissible types of choice behavior by precluding differences in the
degree of substitutability between the different choices.8
(s=1,…,S); and the conditional probability  | ijkt s P  of choosing a particular alternative k within the
alternatives (l=1…Js) in nest s conditional on the choice of that nest.   
In particular, we assume the landowner's utility  ijkt U contains a component  ijkt V  that is
unique to the alternative and another component  ijst V  that depends on each subgroup s:
ijkt ijkt ijst UV V =+ (2)
Each of these components, in turn, included observed and unobserved components:
' ijkt t ijkt ijkt Vx βε =+ (3)
' ijst t ijst ijst Vz γε =+ (4)
where  ijkt x  are observed attributes of each land parcel,  ijst z  are observed attributes of each nest, and
t γ  and  t β  are parameters.  Additional model requirements are that the error terms  ijkt ε  and  ijst ε are
independent and further assumptions ensuring their sum is i.i.d. Gumbel-distributed (Ben-Akiva and
Lerman 2000).  This model yields the following expression for the probability of choosing land use
k at time t+1:
|
1 1
exp( ' ) exp( )
exp( ' ) exp( )
s
ijst st ijst ijkt
ijkt ijst ijkt s SJ





















The inclusive value for nest s is the log of the denominator of the conditional probability in (5) and
is a composite measure of the utility of the alternatives within that subset of alternatives.  This
expression embodies the first-order Markov property since the probability of the parcel changing
use depends only on decision variables in time t.9
Specification issues
Differences in substitutability among different land-use alternatives provide a motivation for
using a nested logit specification.   There are different dimensions along which one can imagine
patterns of substitutability for different land-use choices.
10  Different land quality requirements are
potentially a key determinant of the substitutability among land uses.  Land uses vary distinctly in
terms of where they are found on the spectrum of land quality classes.   Lands in crops have the
highest average land quality, as measured by the Land Capability Class (LCC) system
11, followed by
CRP, pasture, urban, forests, and range lands.  Land uses with more similar land quality
requirements may be considered closer substitutes for a landowner considering choices for a
particular land parcel.
Following this reasoning, we specify a nested logit model with three separate nests: 1) the
“farm” nest containing crops, CRP, and pasture uses; 2) the “non-farm” nest containing forests and
range; and 3) the “urban” nest containing only the urban choice.  We include pasture in the nest
with crops and CRP as it lies closer to these uses in the land quality spectrum.
12  We model urban
development as a distinctly different choice due to its much greater degree of irreversibility and
because land quality is likely to be a less important determinant of the profitability of urban
development.
13
Returning to the landowner’s decision rule presented in (1), the landowner for plot i will
choose the use that yields the greatest expected future stream of discounted net returns minus
conversion costs.  While the landowner presumably acts after comparing the returns to the different
uses on his particular plot of land, we do not have observations on the profits from each land use
                                                
10 To the extent that farmers operate joint crop and livestock operations, farmers may already have skills for pasture and
range uses—rather than forestry, for example—so crops, pasture and range uses may be closer substitutes to each other
than to other uses.  Claassen (1993) argues that a landowner without access to credit might view crop and pasture
production as more similar in terms of producing an annual return in contrast to longer term investment in forestry.   At
the same time, he points out that forest and pasture land uses may be similar in terms of lower labor requirements.
11 The LCC system is based on a ranking of twelve different soil characteristics that are critical for crop production.  The
overall LCC score consists of the lowest ranking given to any of these twelve soil features based on the principle that
this factor will be limiting for crop production (USDA 1973).
12 Assigning values 1 through 4 to the ratings of LCC 1 or 2, LCC 3 or 4, LCC 5 or 6, and LCC 7 or 8, respectively,
yields the following average land qualities for private lands in the contiguous 48 states: 1.5 (crops), 1.9 (CRP), 2.0
(pasture), 2.2 (urban), 2.7 (forests), and 3.0 (range).
13 Due to the limited number of observations for some choices in some time periods, it was not possible to estimate all
the parameters of a model with three nests for all of the starting land uses and time periods considered.  In four out of
the twelve cases where we estimate separate models by transition period, we estimate a model with two nests, including
the urban choice within the farm nest. In particular, we estimate a model with two nests for land starting in pasture for10
particular to each plot.  Instead, we observe county-level returns, which reflect the average
characteristics of the area in each land use in each county.
To account for the variation in net returns at the plot-level, we interact the profit variables
for each land use with a set of dummy variables indexing plot-level land quality.   Land quality will
affect land-use profits principally through its effect on biomass yields.   In particular, we consider
the LCC ranking of the plot, which is a summary measure of the suitability of the land for crop
production.  To the extent that the LCC rating the relevant variation in land quality, land parcels
with qualities below (above) the county average (embodied in the county-level return measures for
each land use) should have their returns scaled down (up) by the coefficient on the interaction with
the LCC ranking.
14
In particular, we specify the equation in (5) for  ijkt V , denoting the parcel-level component of




ijkt it jkt kc jkt it kc ijkt VL C C R L C C R αα β β ε =+ + + +   (8)
where 
0
jkt α  is an alternative-specific intercept, jkt α and  jkt β  are parameters, Rkc denotes county-level
measure of net returns to use k, and 
q
it LCC is a dummy variable indicating whether land plot i is in
land quality q at time t.
15  To ensure sufficient observations in each group, we follow Plantinga
(1996) and combine the eight LCC classes into four.  For identification purposes, we normalize to
zero the coefficients on the dummy variables for the crop alternative and for LCC 1 or 2.
We do not include a measure of CRP profits per acre, as the CRP rental rates are highly
dependent on the profitability of crop production in a region.
16  Instead, we model profits to the
CRP as simply a function of the LCC dummy variables.  While the criteria for CRP eligibility have
varied from signup to signup period, the LCC rating has always been one of the potential criteria for
enrollment.  Other CRP criteria, such as susceptibility to erosion, are also highly correlated with
                                                                                                                                                            
the 1992-97 period, land starting in forest for the 1987-92 and 1992-97 periods, and land starting in range for the 1987-
92 period.
14 The distribution of land quality across counties will differ.  By estimating a single set of coefficients for all counties,
the parameters, we estimate reflect the nationwide average degree of divergence of each LCC category from the county
average land quality for each land use considered.
15 While
q
it LCC is subscripted by t, in practice the LCC rating changes over time on only about 1% of the sample of plots.
16 In addition, CRP enrollment criteria continued to evolve with each signup, making it unclear that extant rental rates
would be an appropriate measure for payments offered in future signups.  In addition, the program has been shifting
away from a broad market-based program towards a strategy of targeting payments to enroll lands with particular
environmental characteristics (USDA ERS 2000).11
lower land quality as measured by the LCC rating (Schatzki 2003).
17  Thus, we would expect the
dummies for the lower land qualities to be positively related to CRP enrollment.
For a given starting land use j, the parameter 
jkt
q α in equation (8) is an intercept term that
varies for each alternative use k.  In combination with 
jkt
qq
it LCC α , these provide an intercept that
varies by land quality and captures unspecified factors that affect the profitability of changing from
use j to k which are not measured by the terms for the parcel-level returns as a function of Rkc.  In
this sense, we interpret these constants as a measure of “conversion costs,” broadly defined as the
opportunity costs of moving to a different land use.
In specifying the nest-level equations that enter into the first term of (5), we include constant
terms for each of the nests interacted with the different land quality groupings to capture differences
in the choice of nests based upon land quality.  In particular, for land parcel i in use j and county c,




ijst it st ijst VL C C I γγ τ =+ +    (9)
where s identifies either the farm, non-farm or urban nests, and q indexes the LCC grouping.  
0
jst γ is
an intercept term specific to each of the three nests,
18 
jst
q γ  is a coefficient on the LCC grouping at
the nest level, and  ijst I is the inclusive value of the nest with coefficient  st τ  in (5).  For identification,
we normalize to zero the coefficients on the farm, crops and range constants and the dummy for
LCC 1 or 2.
Estimation issues
Substituting equations (8) and (9) into (5) yields our nested logit model for estimation.  Our
analysis relies on parcel-level data on both land-use changes and land quality from the NRI, a panel
survey conducted at five-year intervals from 1982 to 1997.  Our dependent variable is the choice of
land-use at time t+5, where t spans one year.  Our independent variables are the land use at time t,
                                                
17 Following Schatzki (2003), another option would have been to develop a specification using measures of erodibility
and other land characteristics from the NRI that determine CRP program eligibility.  This approach was not pursued as
the detailed data on land characteristics from the NRI points did not appear to reflect the eligibility of the corresponding
land parcels for the CRP program.  This is perhaps due to differences in the spatial scales of these particular data versus
the information used for determining the eligibility of an overall land parcel.
18 We include the constant for the urban alternative at the level of the urban nest equation.12
the land quality rating of the parcel, and proxies for the expected net returns from the land-use
alternatives as of t.   In the following sections, we discuss our different data sources in greater detail.
We estimate the model through maximum likelihood procedures based on cross-sectional
variation of the independent variables.
19  We separately estimate parameters for transition
probabilities for each of four starting land uses (crops, pasture, forest, and range) and each of the
available transition periods.  We use all of the observations on land parcels in each respective use at
the start of each of the three periods (1982-87, 1987-92 and 1992-97).
20  Thus, in total, we estimate
twelve separate equations (four land uses times three time periods).
21
One additional econometric issue is the fact that parcels sharing a similar location might
have unobserved characteristics that are correlated across space.  Parcels in the same vicinity will
share locational features—such as distance to urban centers, roads, and other infrastructure—as well
as common zoning and regulatory regimes.  If these features influence land-use decisions, the error
terms in our model will be correlated across space.  In the case of discrete dependent variables,
spatial dependence from either spatial autocorrelation or spatial interdependence in the behavior of
different agents implies heteroskedasticity, causing parameter estimates to be both inconsistent and
inefficient (McMillen 1992; Beron and Vijverberg 1999).  While spatial dependence is a potential
problem in theory, given that our models are estimated with data from the entire country, this will
tend to reduce the influence of any local spatial effects.  We explored the potential importance of
spatial dependence using the simple approach of attempting to purge the sample of spatial
dependence by sampling observations so as to eliminate land parcels within a certain geographic
                                                
19 In the estimation, we weight the observations with the NRI's acreage weights in order to ensure that the estimates
reflect the distribution of potentially unobserved effects in the population.  To avoid shrinking the standard errors due
to this weighting, we scale the weights so that they sum to the total number of actual observations as recommended by
Greene (1998).
20 We also estimated models with pooled data and found that estimation based on the separate cross-sections yielded
superior fits for these particular time periods (Lubowski 2002).  While parameters from pooled data might be superior
for predicting future land-use changes, we use the transition-specific parameter in the current analysis given our goal of
simulating land-use behavior over specific historical periods.
21 For lands enrolled in CRP, we only observe land-use changes from 1992-97 during which time the first CRP contracts
expired and lands became eligible to exit the program.   Modeling land-use changes on CRP lands is complicated by a
variety of factors, including the fact that re-enrollment depends on the landowner’s choice as well as on the acceptance
of the landowner’s bid by the government.  Land-use choices upon CRP contract expiration are the subject of a separate
econometric study using NRI data (Lubowski and Roberts 2003).  For the purpose of the historical simulations
discussed in Section 4, we simulate acres dropping out of the CRP during 1992-97 using a reduced form approach.  We
compute transition probabilities to all uses for plots starting in the CRP using parameters estimated with observations of
plots that started in CRP in 1992.  The estimated coefficients are positive on all the net returns variables and significant
for the profits for crops and forests.  Our approach is not likely to have a significant impact on the major land-use
changes during our period of analysis as the first CRP contracts did not expire until 1996 and the total acreage leaving
the program was relatively small (3.5 million acres or about 10% of total enrolled acreage).13
distance of each other.
22   Estimates of our models with sub-samples of data that include only a
single point in each sampling cluster produced qualitatively similar results than estimates that
included all points, suggesting that spatial dependence is not a critical concern for our analysis.
23
2.2. Data
Data on land use and land characteristics
Conducted by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), the NRI provides
information on land use, land characteristics, and conservation practices for about 800,000 points of
non-federal land in all counties of the contiguous U.S. plus Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.  We observe land use at each NRI point at four points in time (1982, 1987, 1992, 1997),
providing information on land-use change over three five-year periods (1982-87, 1987-92 and 1992-
97).  Each NRI point represents a different number of acres according to an acreage weight that is
inversely proportional to the sampling intensity for that location and land use.  The NRI’s stratified
sampling design is intended to provide acceptable variances of the estimates at the level of states,
212 four-digit hydrological units, and 204 major land resource areas (MLRAs).
We focus on six different land uses: crops, pasture, forest, urban, range, and CRP.  Further
details on the NRI definitions of these uses are provided in the Appendix.  We exclude from our
analysis lands under rural roads and transportation as these land uses are likely to change through a
different decision-making process than profit maximization by private landowners.  We also exclude
streams and water bodies, marshlands, and "barren lands" such as sand dunes, permanent snow
fields, and bare rock, as these are unlikely to respond to economic incentives.  Finally, we exclude
other private lands which the NRI classifies under unspecified "miscellaneous" uses.  With these
adjustments, the land base for our analysis comprises approximately 1.4 billion acres, representing
about 74% of the total land area and about 91% of the non-federal land area in the contiguous 48
states.
Table 1 reports the NRI data on land-use transitions over the entire 1982-97 period of our
analysis.   This table shows how much land that was in a particular use in 1982 was in that same use
as well as each alternative land use in 1997.  For example, of the 286 million acres in crops in 1982,
                                                
22 In recent years, authors have developed new approaches for estimating discrete choice models with spatial
dependence, particularly in terms of spatial probit models. Nevertheless, these methods are computationally infeasible
for our current study given the size of the data set and the number of alternatives in the choice problem considered.
23 A more detailed discussion is provided in Lubowski (2002).14
78% remained in crops in 1997, 10% were in pasture, 1.2% in forest, 1.5% in urban use, 0.8% in
range, and 7.8% in CRP.  The diagonal elements of the table show that land areas tend largely to
remain in their previous use.  In particular, the choice of urban is virtually irreversible, with 99.99%
of urban lands remaining urbanized after fifteen years.
In addition to data on land use, the NRI provides our observations of the Land Capability
Class (LCC) of the plot, which is a summary measure of the suitability of the land for crop
production.  The LCC system is based on a ranking of twelve different soil characteristics that are
critical for crop production.  The overall LCC score consists of the lowest ranking given to any of
these twelve soil features based on the principle that this factor will be limiting for crop production
(USDA 1973).
Data on land-use net returns
Rather than relying on data on net returns information from a single year, we assume that
landowners use the average of annual profits per acre to each land use over the preceding five years
in making their land-use choices at a given time period.
24   In this way, we smooth over idiosyncratic
shocks from weather and other factors that affect profits in particular years.  We observe land-use
choices at five-year increments and do not have information on the year within that time frame that
a particular land-use choice was made.  Letting the time t denote a year, we specify land-use choices
observed at time t+5 as a function of the average land-use profits between years t and t-5.
We construct county-level estimates of annual per acre profits to crops, pasture, forest,
range, and urban uses for all 3,014 counties in the contiguous 48 states.  This provides county-level
observations for five of the six land uses considered, with the exception of the CRP which is treated
differently.  Lubowski (2002) provides a more detailed description of the methods and data sources
used in the construction of the net return measures used in this analysis.
For cropland returns, we use a county-level weighted average of the net returns per acre
from 21 major crops plus the value of direct government payments per acre (excluding CRP
                                                
24 Particularly, we include average profits from 1978-82, 1983-87, and 1988-92 as explanatory variables for the land-use
decisions from 1982-87, and 1987-92, and 1992-97, respectively.  We use lags of five years to capture the general trends
in the movements of land-use profits and minimize the effects of possible outlier estimates in our data by using
information from all the years in between the transition periods.  For the conditional logit model, results for alternate
expectations structures with current and lagged three year returns yield qualitatively similar estimates.15
payments).
25  The weights are the proportion that the planted acreage of a particular crop
represented of the total county's crop acreage in a given year, using acreage information from the
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the USDA.. We use NASS data on state-level
marketing-year-average prices and county-level yields.  Data on cash costs as a percentage of
revenue are obtained at the state and regional level, respectively, from the Census of Agriculture and
USDA Economic Research Service’s (ERS) costs and returns surveys.  Estimates of direct
government payments are from the Census of Agriculture and exclude payments from the
Conservation and Wetlands Reserve programs.
To estimate net returns to land in pasture, we use the county-level average of annual pasture
yields for different soil types from the National Cooperative Soil Survey (NCSS).  Scaled county-
average pasture yields are multiplied by the state price for “other hay” from NASS and state-level
costs for hay production obtained from the Census of Agriculture.  For range returns, we multiply
county forage yields from NCSS by state-level per head grazing rates for private lands from the ERS
database on cash rents.  To the extent that there are any costs of range management, we assume
these costs are borne by the tenant and thus already captured in the grazing rates.
   As described above, county-level net returns for crops, pasture, and range are naturally
computed in annual terms from data on annual yields of major crops and forage.   Returns to forests
and urban uses are calculated as the net present values of a perpetual stream of forest and urban
returns, respectively, and then annualized with an assumed private discount rate of five percent.  We
compute annualized forestry returns using a weighted county-level measure of the net present value
of sawtimber revenues from different forest types where the weights are determined by the species
composition of each county.  We use state-level stumpage prices for different timber species
gathered from a variety of state and federal agencies and private data reporting services. We match
forest prices with regional merchantable timber yield estimates for different forest types developed
by Richard Birdsey of the USDA Forest Service.  We calculate the net present value of an infinite
stream of forestry revenues for each forest type based on an optimal rotation age determined with
the Faustmann formula at our five percent discount rate.  We assume that the forest starts at year
zero in a newly planted state but include estimates of regional replanting and annual management
costs constructed from Moulton and Richards (1990) and Dubois, McNabb and Straka (1999).
                                                
25 We consider the following major crop types tracked by NASS: wheat (winter wheat, durum wheat, and other spring
wheat are treated separately), rye, rice, corn, oats, barley, sorghum, cotton, sugarcane, sugar beets, tobacco, flaxseed,
peanuts, soybeans, sunflowers, all dry edible beans, hay (alfalfa hay and all other hay are treated separately), and potatoes.16
  For urban returns, we use a county-level estimate of the average per-acre price of recently
developed land as described in Plantinga, Lubowski, and Stavins (2003).   Our estimates measure the
average value of a developed parcel less the value of structures and thus correspond to the present
discounted value of the stream of rents from improved bare land.
26  We multiply this net present
value by a five percent interest rate to obtain an annualized per acre estimate of the profits from
urban development.
Table 2 contains summary statistics on the different net returns variables.  Average returns
are listed for 1978 as well as for the three five year periods, 1978-82, 1983-87 and 1988-92.  Trends
over these periods are discussed in Section 4.1 on the different simulation scenarios.
2.3 Econometric Results
The estimation results suggest a good model fit, with tests for IIA and homoskedasticity
supporting the nested specification.  In general, the estimated coefficients are highly significant and
consistent with the expected economic relationships and with the reasoning behind the specification
of parcel-level land-use net returns as a function of county-level profits and parcel-level land quality.
Likelihood ratio tests reject the hypothesis that all of the coefficients are simultaneously equal to
zero at the .01 level.  Similarly, likelihood ratio tests of the conditional logit model and Wald tests of
the nested logit models strongly reject the hypothesis that just the coefficients associated with the
profit variables are simultaneously equal to zero at the .01 level.  For the transition-specific
estimates, pseudo R
2 values (McFadden’s likelihood ratio index) ranging from 0.68 to 0.95 indicate
that the explanatory variables yield better predictions of the transition probabilities Pjk than the mean
value of these variables.  In all cases, values were highest for lands starting in range or forest; values
were lowest for the pasture starting use, suggesting that the model was least able to explain land-use
choices for lands in pasture.
Results of Hausman tests of a conditional logit (non-nested) model reinforce the theoretical
arguments for a less restrictive model such as the nested specification (Hausman and McFadden
1984).
27  For all the starting land uses, the tests failed to reject the IIA hypothesis.
28  For all of the
                                                
26 This measure is based on value of land for the construction of single-family homes, which is the primary use of
developed land at the national scale.
27 This test involves re-estimating the model with one alternative excluded (and observations dropped if that alternative
was actually chosen) and comparing the parameter estimates  ˆ
F β  and  ˆ
R β  of the full and restricted models respectively.
Intuitively, if the change in the coefficients between the unrestricted and restricted models is systematic, this rejects the
null hypothesis that IIA is true.17
starting uses, likelihood ratio tests of the nested model against the corresponding conditional logit
model reject the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors across nests at the .01 level.  Estimates for
the inclusive value parameters on the farm and non-farm nests are also significantly different than
one at the .05 level in 21 out of 24 cases.  These results do not provide evidence for our chosen
nesting structure against other potential nested specifications with this same data.  However, the
results support this particular nested model over a conditional logit (non-nested) model for this
application.
29
For brevity, we report estimated elasticities rather than all the estimated parameters for our
set of 12 equations in Table 3.
30  In general, however, the estimated coefficients are highly significant
and consistent with the expected economic relationships.  The net returns coefficients are generally
significantly different from zero at the 0.1 level or higher and in the expected positive direction,
indicating that higher net returns to a particular land use are associated with higher probabilities of
choosing that alternative. In addition to validating the role of economic profits in driving land-use
changes, the estimates suggest the important role of parcel-level land quality in determining the
response of a land parcel to county-level land-use profits.  The estimated parameters on the land
quality variables are consistent with the idea underlying our specification that the LCC ratings reflect
parcel-level differences in net returns for all of the different land uses, and these coefficients
effectively scale up (down) the net returns on high (low) quality lands.
As expected, the estimates also reveal that lower quality lands are more likely to be enrolled
in the CRP, which is consistent with the eligibility criteria as well as with the higher opportunity
costs of crop production on superior land qualities.  In addition, the estimated constant terms and
land quality dummies indicate the presence of important conversion costs or other unobserved costs
or benefits associated with the alternative uses.  The signs of these variables are consistent with
economic interpretations for the relative costs of converting to the different land uses relative to
crops, the base category.  For instance, the net costs of converting to crops versus other uses appear
                                                                                                                                                            
28 For each of the twelve sets of transition-period-specific estimates (four starting uses and three time periods), excluding
at least one of the categories led to a rejection of the null hypothesis that IIA is valid.  Exclusion of each land-use
alternative led to rejection of the null in at least two cases (for the crop choice) and as many as six cases (for the urban
choice).
29 For the current application of our model, however, the nested specification is not critical for the results.  Simulations
using estimates from a conditional logit (non-nested) version of our model produced similar results in both absolute and
relative terms.
30 The full set of estimates is reported in Lubowski (2002) and is available from the authors upon request.18
to increase as land quality declines, which seems reasonable given that the LCC ratings are designed
to measure the suitability of land for crop production.
We focus on the impacts of the net return variables on the transition probabilities as these
are the key relationships exploited in our simulations.  For each starting use, Table 3 reports the
elasticities for the probability of choosing each particular land-use alternative with respect to the net
returns to that alternative (the "own return" elasticities).  These elasticities are evaluated at the means
of all the variables, including land of quality, for land in each starting use.   The estimated elasticities
indicate the percentage change in the probability of the specified transition for a 1% change in the
profits to the indicated land use.  The associated standard errors are approximated through the Delta
Method.
The elasticity estimates support the expectation that higher profits for a particular land use
are associated with higher probabilities of changing into that use.   In 35 out of 60 cases, the own-
return elasticities are positive and significant as expected at the .05 level.  In the 7 cases where the
own-return elasticities are negative, they are never significantly different from zero at the .05 level.
The cross-elasticities (not reported) are generally opposite in sign to the own-return elasticities and
thus usually negative, as expected.
31
The estimated elasticities indicate that landowners with lands in either crops or pasture are
responsive as expected to the economic returns from all alternative uses.  For land starting in crops,
all of the own-return elasticities are positive and significant in the cross-sectional and pooled
estimates, except for the elasticity with respect to pasture profits for 1982-87, which is negative but
not significant.  For land in pasture, most of the own-return elasticities are also positive and
significant. One exception is the elasticity with respect to pasture choices for 1992-97, which is
negative but not significant at the .05 level.
32   Across all of the starting uses, the pasture variable is
the least significant of the land-use profit variables, reflecting perhaps the relatively lower quality of
the pasture net returns estimates.
For forested lands, the own-return elasticities for crops and urban profits are all positive and
significant at the .01 level, suggesting that these are the uses most competitive with forested lands.
                                                
31 The cross-elasticities are the elasticities of the probability of choosing a particular use j with respect to the profits of a
different use k).  In the nested logit model, these can be of the same sign as the own-return elasticities only when the
inclusive value parameters are negative.  However, this will depend on the relative strength of the variable’s effect on the
probability of choosing the nest versus the probability of choosing the particular land use conditional on the choice of
nest.
32 The other exceptions are the elasticity of the probability of choosing forests with respect to forest profits for 1987-92
and 1992-97, which are positive but not significantly different from zero.19
Two out of three of the pasture and range own-return elasticities and all the forest own-return
elasticities are positive but not significant at the .05 level.  For land in range, the own-return
elasticities with respect to urban profits are all positive and significant at the .05 level. None of the
other own-return elasticities are significantly different from zero. These results suggest that lands in
range are relatively insensitive to the profitability of alternative uses with the exception of urban and
forest uses.  This is reasonable given that range lands tend to be the lands of the lowest quality and
thus unsuitable for any uses that depend on high quality soils.
3. Factual and Counter-Factual Simulations
In this section, we first describe the methods and then report results for our simulations that
isolate the importance of particular economic and policy factors in driving the national-level changes
among the major land uses from 1982 to 1997.   In particular, we simulate the total amount of land
transitioning between the six land-use categories (crops, pasture, forest, urban, CRP and range)
under factual and counterfactual scenarios.
3.1 Simulation Methodology
We use the estimates from our econometric models for the 1982-87, 1987-92 and 1992-97
periods, the county-level profit variables corresponding to our simulation scenarios, and the parcel-
level data on the land quality to estimate parcel-level transition probabilities for each of the five-year
transition periods for each NRI point.  Depending on the land use of the NRI point in our base year
(1982), we multiply the plot-level transition probabilities for that starting use (e.g. crops) for the
period starting in that year (1982-87) by the acreage in that use given by the sampling weights
assigned to each NRI plot.
33  This produces an estimate the acres of land at each location
transitioning from each use to every other use over the next five years.  Using the parcel-level
estimates of the total acres in each use at the start of our new base year (1987), we repeat this
procedure to predict changes from 1987 to 1992.  Similarly, we use the resulting estimates of 1992
acres to predict changes from 1992 to 1997.   Summing together the final simulated plot-level acres
provides the estimated 1997 land use totals for the 48 contiguous United States.
                                                
33 As discussed earlier, given that land virtually never transitions out of urban uses, we did not estimate parameters for
the transition from urban to other uses.  In the simulations, we assume that land in urban uses remains in urban use with
100% probability.20
The “factual” simulation uses the historically observed values of all variables in simulating
land use and provides a check on the predictive accuracy of the model.
 34   The factual simulation
also provides a baseline for comparing the historically observed land-use change against a series of
hypothetical scenarios.   In these counterfactual scenarios, we fix a particular variable (or set of
variables) at a hypothetical level, while keeping all the remaining variables at their historically
observed values.  In this way, we simulate how land-use change would have diverged from the
factual case if just one particular factor had diverged from its historical levels in the specified way.
The difference in the simulated land-use changes between the counterfactual and factual scenarios
provides an estimate of the impact of the factor being analyzed on the historical changes in land use.
Our factual and 10 counterfactual scenarios are listed in Table 4.  To contrast with the
factual simulation, we simulate counterfactual scenarios in which we fix a specific net return variable
(or set of variables) at 1978 levels and allow all the other net return variables take on their factual
values. Given our assumption that landowners consider the average values from 1978-82 when
making decisions for between 1982 and 1987, 1978 is the earliest year relevant for the land-use
decisions in our model.  In comparison with the factual scenario, the counterfactual scenarios fixing
net returns at 1978 levels thus allow us to isolate the effects of the observed changes in the specified
variable(s) since the beginning of our period of analysis, all else remaining the same.
35
The No Change in Any Returns scenario holds constant all of the net return variables at their
1978 values.    In the scenario No Change in Crop+Government Returns, we fix the market-component
of cropland net returns--referred to henceforth as simply the “crop net returns”--as well as
government payments to crop producers at their 1978 values.
36   The scenario No Change in Crop
Market Returns holds only the crop net returns at 1978 levels, allowing government payments (and all
other variables) to take on their factual values.  The scenario No Change in Government Payments fixes
government payments at 1978 levels, allowing the crop net returns (and all other variables) to take
                                                
34 As per our econometric specification, the factual simulations use the average real land-use returns from 1978-82, 1983-
87 and from 1988-92 to compute the probabilities for 1982-87, 1987-92 and 1992-97 respectively.
35 It is unrealistic to believe that if net returns to one land use (e.g. crops) had remained at 1978 levels, the levels of all
other net returns would actually have remained at their historically observed values.  Rather, the resulting changes in U.S.
land use would probably have led to readjustments of prices of crops as well as other land-based commodities, such as
forage and timber.  Nevertheless, our objective is not to predict what would have actually happened if a particular
variable had taken on the value assumed in our counterfactual scenario.  Instead, by holding all other variables constant,
our goal is to identify the independent impact of a change in this variable on the observed changes in land use.
36 Our estimates of county-level crop profits include a market-component (price times yield minus variable costs) plus
estimates of county-level direct government payments to crop producers from all programs (except the CRP which is
treated as a separate land-use category). The effects of crop insurance and other government programs aimed at reducing
the variability of crop returns are not addressed in this analysis.21
on their factual values.   It is important to note that in the econometric analysis we estimate a single
coefficient on crop-plus-government returns, essentially assuming that landowners are indifferent to
a dollar from the government and a dollar from the market.
37  Thus, landowners respond
equivalently in our simulations to changes in these two sources of revenues.  In No Change in Pasture
Returns, No Change in Forest Returns, No Change in Urban Returns, and No Change in Range Returns, we fix
at 1978 levels the net returns from pasture, forest, urban and range, respectively.
In addition to these simulations that examine the effects of changes in the net returns
variables since 1978, we conduct simulations to evaluate the land-use impacts of all government
payments to cropland owners as well as the land-use impacts of the CRP.  In the scenario, No
Government Payments, we set government payments at zero but keep all other variables, including
market crop returns, at the historically observed values.  In the scenario, No Conservation Reserve
Program, we remove the CRP as a land-use option while keeping all the net return variables in our
model at the factual levels.  We remove the option of CRP enrollment by setting to zero all the
variables in the CRP choice equation (the constant term and land quality dummy variables) in all the
probability expressions.  For each of the starting uses, this generates a zero probability of choosing
CRP and reallocates this probability so that the probabilities of the remaining land-use choices sum
to one.  Given the nested logit specification, the probability is reallocated differentially across choice
nests depending on the estimated nest-level parameters and distributed within the choice nests in
equal proportion to the conditional choice probabilities.
The simulations described above exploit the changes in our estimates of land-use net returns
between 1978 and the 1978-82, 1982-87, and 1988-92 periods.  The left panel of Table 2 lists the
values of the estimated mean annual net returns per acre over the different periods; the right panel
of the table lists the changes since 1978.   From 1978 to 1988-92, mean net returns declined for
crops (-31.4%) and pasture (-19.9%) and, slightly, for range (-0.9%).  Mean government payments
increased during this period (+12.2%), offsetting in part the fall in the crop net returns.
Nevertheless, mean crop-plus-government net returns still declined by 27.9% from 1978 to 1988-92.
While the mean net returns to crops, pasture and range decreased between 1978 and 1988-92, they
did not decrease steadily across this period.  Mean crop net returns and crop-plus-government net
returns decreased between 1978 and 1978-82 and increased subsequently from 1978-82 to 1983-87
and from 1983-87 to 1988-92.  Mean government payments increased during the first two periods
                                                
37 While this seems like a useful first approximation, the response might be different in reality if these two streams of net
returns entail different levels of risk or if they convey different signals about expected levels of returns in the future.22
but then declined dramatically from $21.8 in 1983-87 to $12.2 in 1988-92.  Pasture and range mean
net returns both decreased from 1978 to 1978-82 and again over the next five years, but then
increased from 1983-87 to 1988-92.
In contrast to the decrease in mean net returns from crops, pasture and range from 1978 to
1988-92, the mean net returns to forest and urban uses increased from 1978 to 1988-92 by 166.2%
and 29.8%, respectively.   Mean forest net returns initially fell 6.2% from $6.4 to $6.0 from 1978 to
1978-82 but then rose to $9 in 1983-87 and $17.2 in 1988-92.  Mean urban net returns increased
over the first two five-year periods and then declined slightly by 1.7% from 1983-87 to 1988-92.
3.2 Simulation Results
Factual simulation
Comparing the “actual” data on land use and land-use change from the NRI with the
estimates from the factual simulation indicates that the simulation model performs well in
reproducing the direction and relative magnitudes of land-use changes during this period.  In
particular, Table 5.1 shows the totals for each land use at the end of the simulation period (1997)
under the factual and counterfactual simulations, as well as the actual historical values estimated by
the NRI.  Table 5.2 reports the differences between these values and the estimates from the factual
simulation.  The actual (NRI) totals for each land use are in all cases within 1% of the factually
simulated estimates, except in the case of urban acres which exhibited the most dramatic change,
rising by almost half from 1982 to 1997.   In this case, the factual estimate of urban acres in 1997 is
still just 1.67% above the actual acreage reported in the NRI.
While Table 5.2 reports land-use levels, Table 5.3 reports the actual and simulated land-use
changes from 1982 to 1997.  According to the NRI, between 1982 and 1997, cropland decreased by
43.86 million acres, pasture area declined by 11.69 million acres, and range area declined by 10.75
million acres.  At the same time, land area in forest, urban and CRP increased by 3.52, 24.34 and
32.69 million acres, respectively.  The factual simulations predict land-use changes that are in line
with the actual estimates of the NRI.  The factually-simulated (actual) estimates of acreage
percentage changes from 1982 to 1997 are -9.82% (-10.44%) for crops; -8.30% (-8.91%) for pasture;
0.46% (0.88%) for forest; 49.70% (47.19%) for urban; and 1.93% (2.59%) for range. Starting from
zero CRP acres in 1982 before the initiation of the program, the factual simulations predict 32.43
million acres enrolled by 1997, just 0.80% below the 32.69 million acres of CRP land reported in the
NRI.23
Counter-factual simulations
The accuracy of the model in reproducing historical land-use changes supports our use of
the factual simulation as our historical baseline and to simulate land-use changes under different
scenarios.  Tables 6.1-6.6 highlight the relative importance of the different factors examined through
the counterfactual scenarios in driving the acreage changes for each land use.  The first column of
each table reports the total simulated change in acres over 1982-97 for the 48 contiguous states, as
found in Table 5.3.  The second column reports this acreage change as a percent of the factually
simulated acreage change.  The third column reports the difference in the land-use changes between
the counterfactual and factual simulations as a percentage of the factually simulated acreage change.
This provides an estimate of the percentage of the historic acreage change attributable to the
variable that is fixed in each counterfactual scenario.  We discuss these results in turn for each of the
our land-use categories: crops, CRP, pasture, forest, urban, and range.
Crops
During 1982-97, the factual simulation indicates a decline in crop acres of 41.1 million acres
or 9.82% from 1982 levels.   Table 6.1 shows that the CRP combined with declining crop net
returns were the two most significant factors contributing to this substantial decline in cropland
across the contiguous U.S.   The estimated decline in crop acres during this period is only 11.8
million (71.3%) of the factual outcome in the absence of the CRP.   While the program was the chief
driver of cropland decline during this period, our results suggest that the acreage enrolled in the
program overestimates the actual impact of the CRP on cropland retirement.  As shown in Table
5.3, under the No CRP scenario, CRP acreage declines to zero from the 32.4 million factual acres but
crop acres increase by only 29.3 million acres.  These 29.3 million acres are our estimate of the
“additional” acres retired as a result of the CRP over and above the cropland change that would
have occurred under our counterfactual baseline.  In other words, we estimate that 3.1 million acres
or 9.6% of the crop acres that enrolled in the CRP would have left crop production by 1997 even in
the absence of the program.
The more disaggregated simulation results indicate that almost three-quarters of these 3.1
million acres that were absorbed by the CRP would have gone into pasture in the absence of the
program.  In addition to comparing aggregate changes in the different land uses, our simulation
model permits explicit analysis of the effect of the different factors on particular land-use transitions.24
Table 7.1 shows that there is a net increase in acres exiting the cropland category under No CRP,
with the majority of these exits going to pasture (more than 2.3 million acres) and lesser amounts
going to forest, urban and range.
After the CRP, the decline in crop net returns since 1978 was the most significant factor in
driving the decrease in cropland acres in our simulations.  Under No Change in Crop Market Returns,
the simulations indicate that crop acres would have declined by 23.4 million rather than 41.1 million
acres between 1982 and 1997.  Thus, the decline in crop net returns after 1978 accounts for about
17.6 million (42.9%) of the factually simulated change.  The results in Table 7.1 suggest that the
decreases in crop net returns chiefly influenced cropland acres by affecting transitions between crops
and pasture and between crops and CRP.  Holding crop net returns at 1978 levels reduces crop-
pasture transitions by 4.1 million acres and increases pasture-crops transitions by 5.4 million acres.
Crop-CRP transitions decrease by 6.1 million acres and CRP-crop transitions increase by 2.4 million
acres under this scenario.
The contemporaneous increase in government payments to crop producers appears to have
partially blunted the effect of the crop market forces.  Specifically, we estimate that without the
change in government payments after 1978 (No Change in Government Payments), the decline in crop
acres would have been about 3.5 million acres (8.6%) greater than the factual decline.  Taking this
into account, the simulations indicate that the change in crop plus government net returns since
1978 accounts for about 35.6% of the cropland decline from 1982 to 1997. While government
payments thus reduced the impact of declining crop returns on cropland area, the simulations
suggests that government payments are still secondary to the market component of crop returns in
terms of their impact on cropland acreage nationwide.  Specifically, eliminating all government
payments after 1978 (No Government Payments) leads to an additional 7.4 million acres leaving crop
production.  As shown in Table 5.2, this represents a 1.89% decrease in the factually simulated 1997
crop acreage for the 48 contiguous states.  This compares to an increase of 17.6 million acres
(4.68%) under No Change in Crop Market Returns.
Table 7.1 suggests that the total level (as well as the change) in government payments
boosted the amount of acres in crops chiefly by increasing the retention of existing crop acres,
rather than by inducing additional land conversions into crops.  Specifically, we estimate that total
government payments (relative to the No Government Payments scenario) reduced cropland transitions
into the CRP (3.1 million acres) and into pasture (1.9 million acres) and, secondarily, increased
conversion of pasture acres into crops (1.5 million acres).  Overall, eliminating government25
payments in 1978 results in an additional 5.4 million acres leaving crop production and 2 million
fewer acres entering crop production from 1982 to 1997.
While the simulations suggest that the CRP and the changes in crop net returns were the
principal drivers of the decline in crop acres, the results also suggest that the decline in pasture net
returns since 1978 was significant in restraining the cropland decrease.   Particularly, the decline in
crop acres would have been about 17.3% greater under No Change in Pasture Returns.   The other
variables considered in the simulations had minor impacts on crop area change from 1982-97.   We
estimate that the rise in forest net returns restrained the decline in crop acres by about 3.4% while
the increase in urban and range returns increased the decline by 1.5% and 0.2%, respectively.
While forest net returns more than doubled from 1978 to 1988-92, in the simulations the
effect of holding timber prices at the 1978 levels is to reduce crop area in 1997 relative to the factual
estimate.  This is contrary to what one might expect with the forestry alternative being less
economically attractive.  This result suggests the path-dependent character of land-use change.
Specifically, crop acres decrease if forest net returns are fixed at the low 1978 levels because, as
noted earlier, forest net returns did not increase steadily during the simulation period but, rather,
declined initially between 1978 and 1982-87 (Table 2).  Avoiding this initial decline, which increases
cropland area, leads lower cropland acres under No Change in Forest Net Returns compared to the
factual simulation, despite the dramatic increase in forest net returns after 1982-87.
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
The results in Table 6.1 indicate that the decline in crop net returns since 1978 was an
important determinant of CRP enrollment.  Specifically, under No Change in Crop Market Returns,
there is an 18.7% reduction in CRP enrollment in 1997, all other factors held equal.   In addition, by
raising the profitability of crop production, government payments consequently reduced the
incentives for CRP enrollment during the simulation period.  Out results suggest that, all else being
equal, the increase in government crop payments after 1978 reduced CRP enrollment by 5.0%. We
also estimate that eliminating all government crop payments would have increased 1997 acres in
CRP by 10.1%.   
In interpreting these estimates of the impact of particular variables on the CRP, it is
important to remember that we are holding everything else constant, including the policy aspects of
the program--notably the rental rates and eligibility criteria.  In the face of different economic
conditions, these factors would certainly have changed to meet the acreage enrollment target26
established by Congress.  Nevertheless, our counterfactual scenarios are intended to isolate the
relative importance of particular factors, all else constant, rather than to predict the general
equilibrium outcomes of a shock to one variable.
Pasture
In the factual simulation, pasture acres decrease by 10.8 million acres from 1982-97,
representing an 8.3% decrease from 1982 levels.  According to the results in Table 6.3, the historical
decrease in pasture net returns since 1978 accounted for almost three-quarters of the pasture decline
and under the No Change in Pasture Net Returns scenario, total pasture acreage in 1997 is 6.6% higher.
Nevertheless, our results suggest that the change in crop net returns had an even greater influence
on pastureland acres than the decline in pasture profits.  The factual decline in pasture acres is
81.7% lower than the decline under No Change in Crop Market Returns. If crop prices had remained at
1978 levels, total pasture acreage in 1997 would have been about 7.4% lower than even in the factual
case.
While these market factors are the major determinants of pastureland change in our
simulations, government policies also appear to have had significant impacts on pasture acreage.
Particularly, we find that in the absence of the CRP, the decline in pasture acreage would have been
about 24% less.  This results chiefly from increased cropland transitioning to pasture in the absence
of the CRP option, as shown in Table 7.1.  Total 1997 pasture acreage is 2.6 million acres (2.18%)
greater in the No CRP scenario than in the factual simulation (Table 5.3).
Our results also suggest that government crop payments exert an important impact on
pastureland change.   The No Change in Government Payments scenario suggests that increasing
government payments since 1978 increased the decline in pasture acres by about 14.4%.  With
government crop payments eliminated completely (No Government Payments), the simulated 1982-97
decrease in pasture acres is 32.2% lower and the total pasture acreage in 1997 is 3.3 million acres or
2.8% above the factual level (Table 5.2).
Forests
The results in Table 6.4 indicate that the rise in forest net returns after 1978 was the
overwhelming factor driving the increase in forest area from 1982 to 1997 in the 48 contiguous
states.   Under the factual simulation, forest area increases by 1.8 million acres or 0.46%.   This
increase is relatively small, and we find that total forest acreage actually decreases by 0.6 million acres27
(0.15%) between 1982 and 1997 if forest net returns are held at 1987 levels.  Thus, the rise in timber
prices after 1978, even given the 1978 to 1982-87 decline discussed earlier, accounts for more than
the entire increase in forest acres from 1982 to 1997.  Table 7.2 indicates that forest net returns had
a greater influence reducing acreage changes from forests rather than movements of new land into
forests.
38
Given the small change in forest area, we find that any factors with even small impacts on
total forest acres had significant impacts on the magnitude of the forest area change.  Our results
suggest that changes in crop and pasture net returns, though secondary to timber profits, were major
factors promoting the increase in forest acres from 1982 to 1997. Without the decline in crop net
returns after 1978, the increase in forest acres is 87.2% lower than in the factual case.  Under No
Change in Pasture Returns, the results suggest that forest areas would have been larger if pasture profits
had not declined after 1978.   This anomalous result is obtained due to the negative elasticity on the
probability of choosing pasture with respect to pasture profits for lands starting in pasture during
the 1992-97 period.  This elasticity is not significantly different from zero at the .05 level and
contrasts with positive and significant elasticities obtained for the 1982-87 and 1987-92 periods.
This suggests that the actual role of falling pasture net returns on forest area change was likely to
have been negative or closer to zero.
39
The rise in urban net returns after 1978 is also an important factor restraining the increase in
forest acreage.  Without the rise in urban net returns, forests increase by 1.3 million acres (72.2%)
more than in the factual simulation.  As with pasture acres, the simulations also imply that
government policies influenced the change in forest acres.  Holding government payments at 1978
levels and eliminating them completely reduces the increase in forest acres by 10% and 22.3%  (0.2
and 0.4 million acres), respectively.   Similarly, the simulations indicate that forest acres outside the
CRP would have increased about 0.2 million acres more in the absence of the program (14.8% of
the factual increase).
                                                
38 As shown in Table 7.2, flows into forests actually increase overall when net forest net returns are held at the low 1978
levels.  This is due to the avoidance of the initial decline in forest profits from 1978 to 1982.
39 If the 1987-92 coefficients for lands in pasture are used in place of the 1992-97 coefficients, the simulations suggest
that forest areas would have increased by 46% less if the decline in pasture profits had not occurred.  Substituting these
coefficients does not affect the relative direction or relative magnitudes of the other variables’ effects.28
Urban
From 1982 to 1997, urban areas increased by 25.6 million acres (49.7%) under the factual
simulation.   The results in Table 6.5 suggest that this increase was essentially driven by the change
in urban net returns since 1978.  Changes in the net returns to non-urban land uses and the different
policy factors that we analyzed had minor effects on urban area.  In combination, the changes in all
of the net returns variables since 1978 account for about 13.9% of the factual increase in urban
acres.
40  This is overwhelmingly driven by the increase in urban net returns which accounts for
12.9% of the factual increase.  All the other net returns scenarios impact the urban acreage change
by less than 1%, except for the decline in crop net returns which restrains the increase by just 2.2%.
The simulations also suggest that government payments and the CRP restrained the increase in
urban acres but the effects are trivial.
Range
Total range acres declined by 7.9 million acres or 1.93% during 1982-97 in the factual
simulation.  As reported in Table 6.6, we estimate that the rise in forest net returns since 1978 was
the most important factor inducing the range area decline.  In particular, No Change in Forest Net
Returns induces a 4.0 million acre increase in rangeland or 49.8% of the factual range acreage decline.
The simulations suggest that the decline in pasture net returns also exerted a relatively important
influence, restraining the decline in range acres by 13.8%.  Factors of lesser importance were the rise
in urban profits and the fall in crop net returns, which increased and restrained the simulated decline
in range acres by about 8.3 and 7.9%, respectively.  The other variables examined through the
simulation have minor effects on the change in rangeland.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we conduct an econometric analysis of transitions among the major land-use
categories in the 48 contiguous United States.  Using a nested logit specification, we estimate the
parameters of a set of first-order Markov transition probabilities for six different land uses (crops,
pasture, forest, urban, range, and the Conservation Reserve Program) and three different transition
                                                
40 While the simulations suggest that the change in urban net returns was the principal determinant of urban acreage
increase, the relatively low explanatory power of our variables could be a result of the coarseness of our data on the
urban net returns.  While our measure of urban net returns is at the county level, there is a great deal of within-county
variation in urban development potential based on location and other factors that our measures do not capture.
Increasing the fit of our model with more spatially-specific data is an area of on-going research.29
periods (1982-87, 1987-92, and 1992-97).  Simulations using our econometric estimates suggest how
changes in economic returns and government policies have driven land-use changes in the past and
will continue to affect nationwide land-use changes in the future.
Our findings highlight the importance of profits to a range of land-use alternatives as
determinants of land area change for each particular use.  In particular, the results indicate the land-
use margins that are most active for particular land-use categories, and the variables that
consequently have the greatest influence on the area allocated to these land uses.  These variables are
potentially the most effective policy levers available to the government to influence land-use change.
The flip side of this, as some of our counterfactual simulations suggest, is that public policies induce
some "unintended consequences."  Given the fixed size of the land base, national-level policies
affecting the profitability of one land-use alternative necessarily impact changes among the entire set
of economically relevant land-use choices.
In terms of cropland, our results support previous arguments (Vesterby and Krupa 1995;
Alig, Dicks, and Moulton 1998) that the CRP and decline in crop market conditions were the chief
drivers of the decline in crop area from 1982 to 1997.  We also identify the effect of government
crop payments in supporting total cropland acreage but find that this is secondary in magnitude to
the effect of changes in crop markets.  By affecting the profitability of cropland, however,
government payments may have had certain unintended environmental consequences given that we
identify pasture and CRP as the most important land-use margins for crops.  In particular, we find
that acreage in pasture and the CRP would have been almost 3.4 and 3.3 million acres greater in
1997 if government crop payments had been zero after 1978.  While these effects are not large in
comparison with the impacts of market factors, this suggests that the government to an extent is
directly competing with itself in providing incentives for landowners to retire environmentally
sensitive cropland.  In terms of the CRP, our findings illustrate the importance of measuring the
impacts of a land-use policy relative to a counterfactual baseline.  We find that only about 90% of
the lands that enrolled in CRP actually constituted “additional” land retirements induced by the
policy, with the remaining 10% comprising lands that would have left crop production anyway given
the declining profitability of crop production.
  Our results also support the arguments of Vesterby and Krupa (1995) and Anderson and
Magleby (1997) that explain the decline in pasture and range acres in terms of factors that affect the
net returns to grazing.  They emphasize decreases in livestock levels and changes in production
methods, notably greater concentration of animals and use of improved grasses.  Nevertheless, we30
find that changes in crop net returns were a much greater determinant of changes in pasture acres.
This illustrates the importance of considering trends in the profits to alternative land uses, and,
particularly, implies that government policies that bolster cropland profits will have important
impacts on pasture acreage.  Vesterby and Krupa (1995) and Anderson and Magleby (1997) also cite
urbanization and natural forest regrowth as causes of grazing land decline.  We find that the increase
in urban profits had a relatively minor influence on pasture and range acres but that the rise in
profitability of forestry was the dominant determinant of the decline in rangeland acres.
In terms of forest areas, we identify the rise in timber profits as the most important factor
diriving the increase in forest areas between 1982 and 1997.  This is consistent with reports that the
increase in forests was mostly in terms of timberland acreage (Anderson and Magleby 1997; Alig,
Dicks, and Moulton 1998).  In addition, our findings identify declining crop profits as a major factor
affecting forest area during this period, as noted by Alig, Dicks, and Moulton (1998).  This is also
consistent with reports that forest areas increased due to passive regrowth on abandoned agricultural
lands in the Northeast (e.g. Anderson and Magleby; Alig and Wear 1992; Alig, Dicks, and Moulton
1998; Flather, Brady and Knowles 1999).  These findings suggest that policies targeting forest net
returns, such as payment for carbon sequestration, are likely to be the most effective at promoting
forest area increase.  In addition, we find that the time path of forest net returns and the relative
profitability of other land uses, chiefly crops, are also critical.
41  We also identify the increase in the
net returns to urban use as a major factor restraining the growth in forest area.
Our results identify urban net returns as the only significant driver of urban land increase.
These findings are consistent with arguments that the dramatic increase in urban land since 1982
was a response to increased housing demand driven by demographic changes and economic growth
(Heimlich and Anderson 2001).  Our results further suggest that efforts to restrain urban “sprawl”
or to protect open space by increasing net returns to agricultural uses are likely to have limited
effectiveness.  Once urban development becomes feasible, development returns are so much higher
than the returns to other land uses that observed changes in non-urban returns are of insufficient
magnitude to make any difference.  This is consistent with findings that use value assessments and
other preferential tax policies, used in all U.S. states as a policy to encourage the retention of
cropland, have minimal effects in restraining urban development choices (Heimlich and Anderson
2001).
                                                
41 In simulations not reported, we find that simply avoiding the decline in forest net returns from 1978 to 1982 has a
greater impact on forest acreage than increasing forest net returns by 50% in all periods.31
In terms of future research, there are several potential avenues for analysis of nationwide
land-use changes.  Possible refinements of the model include more explicit modeling of landowners’
response to government programs and uncertainty.  Another area for research involves developing
methods for controlling for unobserved parcel-level heterogeneity so as to refine the spatial
resolution of the model for examining land-use changes at regional, state or more local levels.  A
potentially fruitful approach would involve implementing simulation methods for estimating a
random parameters logit model of land-use transition probabilities.  Such models could permit
refinements in terms of more general substitution patterns among land-use choices; improved
modeling of individual-level behavior through random effects panel data estimation; and
incorporation of unobserved heterogeneity by allowing parameters that vary over the population.
In addition, future work could focus on applying the particular estimates and the general
modeling framework developed in this study to examine a variety of potential public policy issues.
Historical simulations can provide an understanding of the effects of historical changes in land-use
profits on different land-use transitions.  Nevertheless, given the limited size of historical changes in
land-use profits, out-of-sample simulations are required to understand the possible impacts from
more dramatic economic and policy scenarios.  This paper develops an empirical framework and
presents a set of estimated parameters that provide a basis for nationwide out-of-sample simulations
to address a wide range of land-use policy issues.32
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Under the definition in the National Resources Inventory (NRI), crop areas include row and
close-grown crops as well as fallow croplands, pasture and haylands in rotation with crops,
permanent haylands, vineyards, fruit trees, and nurseries.  CRP lands are simply those under CRP
contracts while pasture lands are those areas managed for production of introduced forage plants for
livestock grazing that receive cultural treatments such as fertilization and weed control.  In contrast,
range lands have native cover of grasses or grass-like plants suitable for grazing or else contain
introduced forage species but, unlike pasture areas, do not receive any intensive management.
42
The NRI defines areas in forests as areas more than 100 feet in width and of at least one acre
in size that are at least 10% stocked with trees of any size with the potential to reach 13 feet at
maturity.  From an aerial perspective, this definition equates to a canopy cover of at least 25 percent.
The NRI's forest classification also includes lands with evidence of natural forest regeneration.
In contrast to the Census Bureau which measures urban areas on the basis of population
within an incorporated place, the NRI definition of urban/built-up areas is based on the specific use
of the land and includes areas in both predominantly urban and rural areas.  In particular, the NRI
category includes all areas across the spectrum of residential, industrial, commercial, and institutional
uses including rail yards, cemeteries, airports, golf courses, landfills, sewage plants, and water control
structures.  In addition, tracts of less than ten acres that do not fall under these uses (such as small
parks) and highways, railroads, and other transport facilities are included if they are completely
surrounded by urban and built-up land.
                                                
42 Possible management activities on rangelands include only deferred or rotational grazing, burning, fencing, and
minimal chemical or fertilizer treatments.37
Table 1
Changes in Major Non-Federal Land Uses between 1982 and 1997
in the Contiguous 48 States from National Resources Inventory (NRI) 
1
(in thousands of acres)
Land Use in 1997
Land Use in
1982 Cropland Pastureland Forest Land Urban Land Rangeland CRP 2 1982 Total
286,771 36,689 4,532 5,598 3,044 28,689 365,322 Cropland
78.50% 10.04% 1.24% 1.53% 0.83% 7.85% 100%
25,338 128,173 15,166 5,272 3,183 3,053 180,185 Pastureland
14.06% 71.13% 8.42% 2.93% 1.77% 1.69% 100%
1,434 4,772 380,343 9,803 2,099 129 398,579 Forest Land
0.36% 1.20% 95.42% 2.46% 0.53% 0.03% 100%
2 2 2 51,946 0 0 51,951 Urban Land
0% 0% 0% 99.99% 0% 0% 100%
5,602 4,403 3,022 3,055 394,617 729 411,427 Rangeland
1.36% 1.07% 0.73% 0.74% 95.91% 0.18% 100%
319,146 174,037 403,065 75,673 402,943 32,599 1,407,463 1997 Total
22.68% 12.37% 28.64% 5.38% 28.63% 2.32% 100%
1 Percentages are of 1982 totals (far right column).  Totals include only land parcels which were non-federal and in the six listed uses in 1982 as well as
1997.  Read the table horizontally to see how land that was under a particular land use in 1982 (row heading) was subsequently allocated in terms of land
use in 1997 (column heading).  Read the table vertically to see how land that that was in a particular land use in 1997 (column heading) was previously
allocated in terms of land use in 1982 (row heading).
2 Note that there is no corresponding row entry for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) as this federal program was established in 1985.38
Table 2. Own-Return Land-Use Choice Elasticities Evaluated at the Means
Own-Return Elasticity
1  by Destination Land Use and Time Period
Crops Pasture Forest Starting Land
Use
1982-87 1987-92 1992-97 1982-87 1987-92 1992-97 1982-87 1987-92 1992-97
Crops 0.0143** 0.0348** 0.0110** -0.0048 0.0822** 0.1828** 0.8763** 0.7489** 0.3101**
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0272) (0.0235) (0.0312) (0.0522) (0.0723) (0.0433)
Pasture 0.2991** 0.3799** 0.3413** 0.0292** 0.0036** -0.0119 0.2227** 0.0784 0.0049
(0.0232) (0.0308) (0.0218) (0.0036) (0.0012) (0.0081) (0.0303) (0.0555) (0.0267)
Forest 0.2104** 0.2797** 0.2946** 0.1047 0.0396 -0.0075 0.0004 0.0007 0.0006
(0.0656) (0.0543) (0.0644) (0.0577) (0.0910) (0.0591) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0547)
Range -0.0415 0.3491 0.0655 0.2200 -0.1539 0.3986 0.0839 0.0291 0.1268
(0.0458) (0.1776) (0.2290) (0.1715) (0.5331) (0.4169) (0.3601) (0.4225) (0.9058)
Own-Return Elasticity
1  by Destination Land Use and Time Period
Urban CRP Range Starting Land Use
1982-87 1987-92 1992-97 1982-87 1987-92 1992-97 1982-87 1987-92 1992-97
Crops 0.3952** 0.2482** 0.3418** n/a n/a n/a 0.6793** 0.2944** 0.3765**
(0.0236) (0.0133) (0.0159) (0.0870) (0.0703) (0.0477)
Pasture 0.4303** 0.2959** 0.3306** n/a n/a n/a 0.8509** 0.7056** 1.0421**
(0.0516) (0.0271) (0.0259) (0.1279) (0.1666) (0.0496)
Forest 0.2313** 0.2986** 0.7920** n/a n/a n/a 0.2852 -0.5639 0.2316
(0.0203) (0.0754) (0.0576) (0.2197) (3.4581) (0.3305)
Range 0.5558** 0.3983* 0.4190** n/a n/a n/a -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0015
(0.0486) (0.1790) (0.0310) (0.0059) (0.0018) (0.9712)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  Elasticities are evaluated at the
means of the data for the specified starting use using the estimated parameters from the nested logit model.  Standard errors are
estimated using the Delta Method.
1 This is the percentage change in the probability of choosing the destination use (conditional on being in the starting land use) for a 1%
change in the profits to the destination use.39
Table 3. Estimated County-Level Annual Net Returns per Acre from the Major Land Uses
for the 48 Contiguous United States, 1978-1992 (Values in 1990 dollars)
 1
Mean, Standard Deviation Change From 1978 ($ and %) Net Returns
($/acre/year) 1978 1978-82 1983-87 1988-92 1978 1978-82 1983-87 1988-92
102.0 43.2 52.0 70.6 0 -58.8 -50 -31.4 Crop 
 net returns
(market-based)
 2 (69.1) (34.4) (39.5) (46.6) 0% -57.7% -49.0% -30.8%
8.7 15.2 21.8 12.2 0 6.5 13.1 3.5 Government
payments
3 (4.7) (7.2) (8.8) (6.0) 0% 74.3% 149.0% 39.6%
110.7 58.4 73.8 82.8 0 -52.3 -36.9 -27.9 Crop+Government
net returns
4 (69.8) (38.4) (45.0) (48.2) 0% -47.3% -33.4% -25.3%
32.6 16.1 7.9 12.7 0 -16.5 -24.7 -19.9 Pasture net returns
(28.4) (11.3) (8.0) (9.0) 0% -50.5% -75.6% -61.1%
6.4 6.0 9.0 17.2 0 -0.4 2.6 10.8 Forest net returns
(6.4) (5.9) (9.0) (17.1) 0% -7.2% 39.7% 166.2%
1,809.0 1,946.3 2,389.5 2,348.8 0 137.3 580.5 539.8 Urban net returns
(1,808.9) (1,946.3) (2,389.4) (2,348.8) 0% 7.6% 32.0% 29.8%
11.3 11.2 10.3 10.4 0 -0.1 -1 -0.9 Range net returns
(10.5) (10.1) (8.9) (9.3) 0% -1.4% -8.8% -8.0%
1 Values are averages over each five year period of weighted annual county-level returns where weights are based on the
county acreage in each land use.  Values are in 1990 dollars, deflated using the producer price index for all commodities
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The construction of the different net return measures is discussed in the paper.
2 Includes only the market-component of crop net returns (price times yield minus variable costs).
3 Includes estimates of direct government payments per crop acre, not including the Conservation Reserve Program.
4 Equals the sum of the market-component of crop net returns plus the government payments.40
Table 4.  Description of Simulation Scenarios
Scenarios Description
1) Factual All returns take on observed historical values.
2) No Change in Any Returns Fix all returns at 1978 values.
3) No Change in Crop+Government  Returns Fix crop returns and government payments at 1978
values.
4) No Change in Crop Market Returns Fix crop returns from market but not government
payments at 1978 values.
5) No Change in Government Payments Fix government farm payments at 1978 values.
6) No Government Payments Set government farm payments at zero.
7) No Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Eliminate CRP as land-use option.
8) No Change in Pasture Returns Fix pasture returns at 1978 values.
9) No Change in Forest Returns Fix forest returns at 1978 values.
10) No Change in Urban Returns Fix urban returns at 1978 values.
11) No Change in Range Returns Fix range returns at 1978 values.41
Table 5.1. Results for Land Use in Ending Year (1997) of Simulations
Total Land in Base Year (1982) of Simulation (thousands of acres)
Scenario Crops Pasture Forest Urban CRP Range Total 2
Actual (NRI) 
1 418,784 130,294 399,498 51,582 0 413,251 1,413,409
Total Land In Ending Year (1997) of Simulation (thousands of acres)
Actual (NRI)
376,383 119,513 404,680 75,924 32,696 404,824 1,414,019
(1) Factual
Simulation 377,647 119,481 401,346 77,217 32,437 405,280 1,413,409
(2) No Change in
Any Returns 384,680 120,364 399,736 73,646 26,696 408,287 1,413,409
(3) No Change in
Crop+Govt. Returns 392,279 112,117 400,009 76,748 27,509 404,747 1,413,409
(4) No Change in
Crop Market Returns 395,307 110,648 399,792 76,644 26,368 404,650 1,413,409
(5) No Change in
Govt. Payments 374,114 121,036 401,531 77,318 34,048 405,361 1,413,409
(6) No Govt.
Payments 370,157 122,859 401,758 77,436 35,718 405,480 1,413,409
(7) No CRP
406,959 122,089 401,620 77,625 0 405,117 1,413,409
(8) No Change in
Pasture Returns 370,522 127,468 402,457 77,239 31,540 404,184 1,413,409
(9) No Change in
Forest Returns 376,252 119,245 398,882 77,403 32,374 409,253 1,413,409
(10) No Change in
Urban Returns 378,257 120,140 402,679 73,918 32,474 405,940 1,413,409
(11) No Change in
Range Returns 377,723 119,509 401,360 77,285 32,439 405,094 1,413,409
1 The Actual (NRI) scenario reports the actual land-use estimates according to the National Resources Inventory.
2 Actual (NRI) totals declined from 1982 to 1997 due to changes in acres allocated to federal and other land-use
categories not modeled in the simulations (water bodies, rural transportation, and “minor” uses).42
Table 5.2. Results for Changes in Land Use over Simulation Period (1982 to 1997)
Total Changes Over Simulation Period (1982-1997) (thousands of acres, % change since 1982)





























































































































































































1 The Actual (NRI) scenario reports the actual land-use estimates according to the National Resources Inventory.
2 Actual (NRI) totals declined from 1982 to 1997 due to changes in acres allocated to federal and other land-use
categories not modeled in the simulations (water bodies, rural transportation, and “minor” uses).43
Table 5.3. Results for Land Use in Ending Year (1997) of Simulations
Difference from Factual Simulation (thousands of acres, difference as % of factual simulation)





























































































































































































1 The Actual (NRI) scenario reports the actual land-use estimates according to the National Resources Inventory.
2 Actual (NRI) totals declined from 1982 to 1997 due to changes in acres allocated to federal and other land-use
categories not modeled in the simulations (water bodies, rural transportation, and “minor” uses).44
Table 6.1. Simulated Change in Crop Acreage in Contiguous 48 United States: 1982 to 1997












(1) Factual Simulation -41,136.8 100.0% 0.0%
(2) No Change in Any Returns -34,103.9 82.9% -17.1%
(3) No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns -26,505.1 64.4% -35.6%
(4) No Change in Crop Market Returns -23,477.4 57.1% -42.9%
(5) No Change in Govt. Payments -44,670.1 108.6% 8.6%
(6) No Government Payments -48,626.9 118.2% 18.2%
(7) No CRP -11,825.7 28.7% -71.3%
(8) No Change in Pasture Returns -48,262.3 117.3% 17.3%
(9) No Change in Forest Returns -42,532.3 103.4% 3.4%
(10) No Change in Urban Returns -40,526.7 98.5% -1.5%
(11) No Change in Range Returns -41,061.3 99.8% -0.2%
1 The difference between the counterfactual and factual simulation divided by the factual simulation.  Positive
(negative) values indicate that the crop acreage decrease was smaller (greater) in the factual versus counterfactual
simulation.
Table 6.2.  Simulated Change in Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Acreage in Contiguous
48 United States: 1982 to 1997












(1) Factual Simulation 32,437.2 100.0% 0.0%
(2) No Change in Any Returns 26,696.3 82.3% -17.7%
(3) No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns 27,508.7 84.8% -15.2%
(4) No Change in Crop Market Returns 26,367.9 81.3% -18.7%
(5) No Change in Govt. Payments 34,048.2 105.0% 5.0%
(6) No Government Payments 35,718.3 110.1% 10.1%
(7) No CRP 0.0 0.0% -100.0%
(8) No Change in Pasture Returns 31,539.8 97.2% -2.8%
(9) No Change in Forest Returns 32,374.2 99.8% -0.2%
(10) No Change in Urban Returns 32,474.5 100.1% 0.1%
(11) No Change in Range Returns 32,438.6 100.0% 0.0%
1 The difference between the counterfactual and factual simulation divided by the factual simulation.  Positive
(negative) values indicate that the CRP acreage increase was smaller (greater) in the factual versus counterfactual
simulation.45













(1) Factual Simulation -10,812.0 100.0% 0.0%
(2) No Change in Any Returns -9,929.6 91.8% -8.2%
(3) No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns -18,177.0 168.1% 68.1%
(4) No Change in Crop Market Returns -19,645.3 181.7% 81.7%
(5) No Change in Govt. Payments -9,257.4 85.6% -14.4%
(6) No Government Payments -7,434.1 68.8% -31.2%
(7) No CRP -8,205.0 75.9% -24.1%
(8) No Change in Pasture Returns -2,826.0 26.1% -73.9%
(9) No Change in Forest Returns -11,049.0 102.2% 2.2%
(10) No Change in Urban Returns -10,153.3 93.9% -6.1%
(11) No Change in Range Returns -10,784.6 99.7% -0.3%
1 The difference between the counterfactual and factual simulation divided by the factual simulation.  Positive
(negative) values indicate that the pasture acreage decrease was smaller (greater) in the factual versus counterfactual
simulation.













(1) Factual Simulation 1,847.4 100.0% 0.0%
(2) No Change in Any Returns 237.1 12.8% -87.2%
(3) No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns 511.0 27.7% -72.3%
(4) No Change in Crop Market Returns 293.4 15.9% -84.1%
(5) No Change in Govt. Payments 2,032.9 110.0% 10.0%
(6) No Government Payments 2,259.2 122.3% 22.3%
(7) No CRP 2,121.6 114.8% 14.8%
(8) No Change in Pasture Returns 2,958.2 160.1% 60.1%
(9) No Change in Forest Returns -616.2 -33.4% -133.4%
(10) No Change in Urban Returns 3,180.8 172.2% 72.2%
(11) No Change in Range Returns 1,861.1 100.7% 0.7%
1 The difference between the counterfactual and factual simulation divided by the factual simulation.  Positive
(negative) values indicate that the forest acreage increase was smaller (greater) in the factual versus counterfactual
simulation.46













(1) Factual Simulation 25,634.8 100.0% 0.0%
(2) No Change in Any Returns 22,064.3 86.1% -13.9%
(3) No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns 25,166.4 98.2% -1.8%
(4) No Change in Crop Market Returns 25,062.3 97.8% -2.2%
(5) No Change in Govt. Payments 25,736.3 100.4% 0.4%
(6) No Government Payments 25,854.5 100.9% 0.9%
(7) No CRP 26,043.1 101.6% 1.6%
(8) No Change in Pasture Returns 25,657.1 100.1% 0.1%
(9) No Change in Forest Returns 25,820.9 100.7% 0.7%
(10) No Change in Urban Returns 22,335.9 87.1% -12.9%
(11) No Change in Range Returns 25,703.5 100.3% 0.3%
1 The difference between the counterfactual and factual simulation divided by the factual simulation.  Positive
(negative) values indicate that the urban acreage increase was smaller (greater) in the factual versus counterfactual
simulation.













(1) Factual Simulation -7,970.5 100.0% 0.0%
(2) No Change in Any Returns -4,964.2 62.3% -37.7%
(3) No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns -8,503.9 106.7% 6.7%
(4) No Change in Crop Market Returns -8,601.0 107.9% 7.9%
(5) No Change in Govt. Payments -7,889.8 99.0% -1.0%
(6) No Government Payments -7,770.9 97.5% -2.5%
(7) No CRP -8,134.0 102.1% 2.1%
(8) No Change in Pasture Returns -9,066.8 113.8% 13.8%
(9) No Change in Forest Returns -3,997.7 50.2% -49.8%
(10) No Change in Urban Returns -7,311.2 91.7% -8.3%
(11) No Change in Range Returns -8,157.1 102.3% 2.3%
1 The difference between the counterfactual and factual simulation divided by the factual simulation.  Positive
(negative) values indicate that the range acreage decrease was smaller (greater) in the factual versus counterfactual
simulation.47
Table 7.1. Cropland Transitions, 1982 to 1997:  Differences from Factual Simulation for Selected













No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns -3,457 -133 -206 -4,857 -94 -8,748
No Change in Crop Market Ret. -4,118 -159 -248 -6,095 -107 -10,728
No Change in Govt. Payments 934 27 44 1,722 14 2,741
No Government Payments 1,986 60 94 3,288 38 5,466
No CRP 2,365 262 329 -34,209 284 -30,969













No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns 4,581 850 0 156 297 5,884
No Change in Crop Market Ret. 5,490 963 0 92 387 6,932
No Change in Govt. Payments -714 -66 0 58 -71 -792
No Government Payments -1,573 -151 0 -82 -217 -2,024
No CRP 315 18 0 2,482 490 -1,658
No Change in Pasture Returns -1,826 -149 0 -71 -1,007 -3,054
Table 7.2. Forest Transitions, 1982 to 1997:  Differences from Factual Simulation for Selected













No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns 850 -163 -87 -7 -2 591
No Change in Crop Market Ret. 963 -184 -104 -8 -2 666
No Change in Pasture Returns -149 669 -98 -4 -3 415
No Change in Forest Returns 15 45 247 1 5,147 5,454













No Change in Crop+Govt. Returns -133 -600 0 -11 -1 -745
No Change in Crop Market Ret. -159 -705 0 -23 -2 -888
No Change in Pasture Returns -37 1,569 0 -2 -4 1,526
No Change in Forest Returns 1,834 570 0 -128 714 2,991
No Change in Urban Returns 97 654 0 10 45 806